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ARGUMENT
I.

Arnold was not entitled to judgment as a matter of law on the
"discovered" issue because the evidence demonstrated the existence of a
genuine issue of material fact and that she was not entitled to judgment
as a matter of law.
A.

Arnold's arguments are without merit because they depend on an
erroneous interpretation of Arnold IV.
1.

The ultimate issue is the factual question of whether Arnold
discovered or should have discovered a legal injury.

Arnold's claim of entitlement to summary judgment (like her assertions of
error on appeal) depends on a mistaken interpretation of this Court's decision in

Arnold IV. 1 In considering the propriety of the partial summary judgment the
district court granted Arnold, it is crucial to keep in mind what the essential issue
of fact is: at what time Arnold discovered (or should have discovered) her legal
injury, causing the statute of limitations to begin running. This is inherent in the
statute of limitations, which "requires that a medical malpractice action 'be
commenced within two years after the plaintiff or patient discovers, or through the
use of reasonable diligence should have discovered the injury, whichever first
occurs, but not to exceed four years after the date of the alleged act, ... neglect, or
occurrence."'2 In turn, discovery of legal injury occurs when a patient is aware (1)
1

Arnold v. Grigsby, 2012 UT 61, 289 P.3d 449 (hereafter "Arnold IV'').

' .. ,,.\

'-Ji

-2

/d. 113 (quoting Utah Code§ 78B-3-404(1)).
1
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of physical injury and (2) that such injury may be attributable to negligence:
"Discovery of legal injury, therefore, encompasses both awareness of physical
injury and knowledge that the injury is or may be attributable to negligence." 3 (In
considering whether the patient should have discovered her legal injury, the
question is whether, under the facts known to the patient, a reasonable person
would be aware of injury and that such injury may be attributable to negligence. 4)
Moreover, whether an individual had awareness of sufficient facts to trigger the
statute of limitations "is a classic factual dispute that should be resolved by the
finder of fact" 5 and is therefore rarely an appropriate issue for granting summary
judgment.
Within this context, the significance of evidence of various subsidiary facts
depends on the degree to which those facts bear on this fundamental question of
fact that the jury is to decide-in this case, as this Court previously noted, when

3

Chapman ex rel. Chapman v. Prfmary Children's Medical Center, 784
P.2d 1181, 1184 (Utah 1989) (emphasis added).
4

"Accordingly, the two-year statute of limitations is triggered only when the
plaintiffs investigation has revealed 'facts that would lead an ordinary person,
using reasonable diligence, to conclude that a claim for negligence may exist."'
Arnold JV,r 21 (quoting Jensen v. lHC Hosps., Inc., 2003 UT 51, ,r 61, 82 P.3d
1076).
5

Sevy v. Security Title Co., 902 P.2d 629, 634 (Utah 1995); see also
Arnold JV,r 13 (whether and when an injured patient discovered or should have
discovered legal injury is a fact-intensive question).
2
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Arnold discovered (or should have discovered) her legal injury. 6 Thus, to the
extent that subsidiary facts support the conclusion that by a particular time, Arnold
knew (or should have known) she had sustained an injury and that such injury may
be attributable to negligence, those facts support the ultimate factual conclusion
that she had discovered (or should have discovered) her legal injury. If evidence
supporting such subsidiary facts is presented, that evidence necessarily creates a
genuine issue of material fact precluding summary judgment. 7

2.

Arnold's argument depends on her erroneous premise that
Arnold Wheld that Grigsby failed to set forth a primafacie
case.

Arnold's defense of the partial grant of summary judgment in her favor
hangs on her erroneous premise that Arnold /Vheld that Grigsby could only
establish a prima facie statute of limitations defense by adducing different types of

6

Arnold IV,I 33 ("[W]e remand for the jury to determine whether Ms.
Arnold filed her claim more than two years after she discovered or should have
discovered her legal injury.").
1

See Rule 56(a), U.R.C.P.; Holbrook Co. v. Adams, 542 P.2d 191 (Utah
1975) ("if there is any dispute as to any issue, material to the settlement of the
controversy, the summary judgment should not be granted"); Smith v. Four
Corners Mental Health Ctr. Inc., 2003 UT 23, ,I 13, 70 P.3d 904 (identification of
a material factual issue on review requires reversal of a grant of summary
judgment).
3
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evidence than those this Court considered in Arnold IV. 8 Arnold therefore
repeatedly characterizes the additional evidence Grigsby developed after remand
as merely showing suspicion of negligence or initiation of an investigation. 9
(However, Arnold fails to recognize that the additional evidence relating to her
interactions with Nurse Vemiew is a different type of evidence than "suspicion of
negligence" or "commencement of an investigation," given that the evidence,
construed in favor of Grigsby, shows that Arnold was actually subjectively
"planning a suit," 10 which is more than "mere suspicion" or initiation of an
investigation.)
According to Arnold, if Grigsby failed to bring forward additional types of
evidence, he could not demonstrate a genuine issue of material fact for trial and
could not withstand a motion for summary judgment. In other words, in her view,
regardless of the weight a jury might assign. it, if the evidence does not go beyond

establishing Arnold was aware of the existence of symptoms, suspected that
negligence caused the complication, and commenced investigation into potential

8

See Reply-Arnold 13: "In determining that certain evidence was legally
insufficient, this Court required Dr. Grigsby to adduce new, material evidence to
show a genuine issue for trial." See also id. at 4, 5-6, 6-7, 9, 10-11, 11-12, 13, 15.

9Reply-Arnold 8, 12, 13-14, 16-17; Brief-Arnold 29-30, 32-33, 39-40.

°R..

1

1484, 1486.
4
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legal action, then the evidence is inadequate to support a jury in concluding that
Arnold knew that she had sustained an injury and knew that such injury may have
been caused by negligence. Under this erroneous interpretation of Arnold IV,
according to Arnold, even if a jury concludes that she subjectively believed that
negligence did cause her injury, that is insufficient to conclude that she knew the
injury may have been caused by negligence. Similarly, even if a jury concludes
that she wanted to get an attorney to sue Grigsby because she believed his
negligence injured her, according to her that is insufficient to conclude that she
was aware of injury and that such injury may have been caused by negligence.
Both from the perspective of the applicable legal principles and from simple
common sense, Arnold's interpretation is untenable.
This also demonstrates that Grigsby's characterization of Arnold as
asserting the irrelevance of the Arnold IV categories of evidence is not a "straw
man argument" (as Arnold claims 11 ) but to the contrary is substantively fair: if the
evidence is relevant, then the jury would be entitled to weigh that evidence as it
sees fit in deliberating the ultimate fact question of whether Arnold discovered her
claim. Moreover, it also demonstrates that notwithstanding her denial, 12 Arnold in

11

Reply-Arnold 5, 15.

12

/d. at 9.
5
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substance argues that Arnold ]V's reversal of summary judgment for Grigsby
mandated the grant of her motion for summary judgment based on the same
categories of evidence which this Court previously said warranted jury
consideration 13 (and that is plainly the argument she persuaded the district court to
accept 14).

3.

Arnold erroneously conflates a prima facie case with
entitlement to judgment as a matter of law.

Arnold's argument fails because Arnold IV does not say what she claims it
does. She improperly conflates the concepts of a prima facie case (sufficient to
support a jury verdict15) with entitlement to judgment as a matter of law in the
absence of a genuine issue of material fact on summary judgment (foreclosing
consideration by a jury16). While this error is apparent in several portions of her

13

Arnold JVifif 32-33.

14

See infra Point LC.

Bair v. Axiom Design, LLC, 2001 UT 20, ,r 14, 20 P.3d 388 ("A prima
facie case has been made when evidence has been received at trial that, in the
absence of contrary evidence, would entitle the party having the burden of proof
to judgment as a matter of law." (emphasis added)). In the context of a factintensive question such as discovery of legal injury, this is equivalent to whether
sufficient evidence has been presented to support a jury verdict. Because any
contrary evidence is disregarded in this analysis, it is also equivalent to construing
evidence in favor of the nonmoving party on summary judgment.
15

16

As explained by Holbrook Co. v. Adams, 542 P.2d 191, 193 (Utah 1975),
the purpose of summary judgment is not to weigh the evidence or to deny parties
6
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(%::;.1

brief, 17 it is perhaps most clear in her argument that
Unlike Collins, the Court in Arnold IV plainly found that Dr. Grigsby had
failed to meet his initial burden on summary judgment insofar as the Court
delineated what evidence was "insufficient" to establish Dr. Grigsby's
motion for summary judgment on his statute of limitation defense. Based
upon such, when he was subsequently confronted with Ms. Arnold's motion
for summary judgment, Dr. Grigsby was required to adduce new and
additional evidence, "more" evidence, to meet his prima facie burden and
show a triable issue in th~ case. 18
As pointed out above, Grigsby did produce a different type of evidence on remand
and that was before the district court on summary judgment. In any event, Arnold
fails to point to any language in Arnold IV which states or even implies that the
evidence Grigsby presented in support of his motion for summary judgment would
be insufficient to support a jury verdict in his favor (and thus inadequate to raise a
jury question). To the contrary, Arnold IV repeatedly states that the evidence as

the right to a trial to resolve disputed factual issues but rather "to eliminate the
time, trouble and expense of trial when upon any view taken of the facts as
asserted by the party ruled against, he would not be entitled to prevail. Only when
it so appears, is the court justified in refusing such a party the opportunity of
presenting his evidence and attempting to persuade the fact trier to his views."
(Emphasis added.)
17

Reply-Arnold 5-6 (asserting Arnold JVheld that Grigsby "was required to
adduce evidence to make a prima facie showing of the elements of his defense.");
id. at 8 (asserting that Arnold JVheld that Grigsby's prior showing on his summary
judgment motion was "insufficient to raise a prima facie case of Dr. Grigsby's
statute of limitation defense.").
18

Jd. at 10 (footnotes omitted).
7
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presented created a question for jury consideration. 19
Given that the determinative issue is the factual question of whether a
patient was or should have been aware of a legal injury, there is a significant and
substantial difference between the conclusion that certain evidence, construed in
favor of the nonmoving patient on summary judgment, fails to conclusively
establish this fact (which is what Arnold IV actually held) and the conclusion that
when on a separate motion the same evidence is construed in favor of the

nonmoving physician, Dr. Grigsby, such evidence could not support a finding that
Arnold was or should have been aware of legal injury (which is what Arnold
incorrectly claims Arnold JV held). Furthermore, as discussed below,20 accepting
Arnold's reading of Arnold IV also requires accepting the unlikely proposition that
the court intended to sub silentio overrule Collins v. Wilson, 21 thereby significantly
restricting the medical malpractice statute of limitations defense.

19

E.g., "[W]e remand for the jury to determine whether Ms. Arnold filed her
claim more than two years after she discovered or should have discovered her
legal injury." Arnold IV,I 33; see also id. ,r,r 5, 32.
20

See infra I.B.

21

1999 UT 56,984 P.2d 960.
8
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4.

Arnold JV merely held that Grigsby failed to demonstrate
entitlement to judgment in his favor without jury weighing
of the evidence.

All that Arnold IV held was that the evidence Grigsby presented was

inadequate to establish his defense as a matter oflaw, which is to say this Court
rejected the position that regardless of what weight a jury might give to the
subsidiary facts accepted as undisputed, the jury must ·still find that Arnold knew
(or should have known) that her injury may have been caused by negligence.
Phrased affirmatively, Arnold IV merely held that notwithstanding the undisputed
facts, the jury in weighing the evidence of the subsidiary facts might conclude that
Arnold did not know (and a reasonable person might not know) that her injury
may have been caused by negligence. Thus, the substance of Arnold /V's holding
was that there remained a genuine issue of material fact precluding summary
judgment for Grigsby. Arnold's ''prima facie defense" argument inverts the

Arnold IV holding, in substance asserting that it held that a jury weighing the
evidence could not conclude on the basis of the kinds of evidence previously
presented by Grigsby that Arnold knew (or that a reasonable person might lmow)
that her injury may have been caused by negligence.

9
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B.

Grigsby met his burden to defeat summary judgment by
identifying evidence which, construed in his favor, was sufficient
to support a jury verdict for him.

Contrary to Arnold's argument, Grigsby met his burden of demonstrating
that there was a genuine issue of material fact and that Arnold was not entitled to
judgment as a matter of law.
1.

Grigsby correctly construes Collins v. Wilson, which is
directly on point with the central issue of this appeal.

As an initial matter, not only is Arnold's claim that Grigsby misconstrues

Collins v. Wilson without merit, but Arnold also fails to address the actual import
and holding of that case. Responding to Grigsby' s point that Collins demonstrates
that evidence which is insufficient to support summary judgment can nevertheless
support a jury verdict,22 Arnold asserts that Grigsby "misapprehends this Court's
holding in Collins, which has no application to the specific issue posed by this
case." 23 However, Arnold then neither identifies nor discusses the actual holding
of Collins, which upheld a jury verdict in favor of a physician on the statute of
limitations defense, and in so doing discussed what evidence could support such a
verdict. 24 Instead, after mentioning that Collins does not discuss the specific

22

Brief-Grigsby 40.

23

Reply-Arnold 9-10.

24

See id. at 10-11; see Collins, 1999 UT 56, ,r,r 15-21, 984 P.2d 960.
10
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grounds for the pretrial denial of summary judgment to the physician, Arnold
reasserts her erroneous reading of Arnold IV as requiring Grigsby to produce
additional evidence to withstand summary judgment as the nonmoving party. 25
Arnold then compounds her error by asserting that Arnold IV "plainly found that
Dr. Grigsby had failed to meet his initial burden on summary judgment" in
reversing the grant of judgment to Grigsby and asserting that this demonstrates the
correctness of her reading of Arnold IV. 26 However, Arnold IV does not refer to
the concept of an "initial burden," and in substance holds that Grigsby failed to
demonstrate the absence of a genuine issue of material fact and entitlement to
judgment in his favor as a matter of law-that is, that a jury could, notwithstanding
the evidence presented, find against him on the ultimate issue of fact. 27
Although Arnold summarily dismisses Collins, that opinion is directly on
point with the crux of this appeal because it is this Court's most recent statement

25

Reply-Arnold 10-11.

26

1d. at 10.

See Orvis v. Johnson, 2008 UT 2, ~ 10, 177 P.3d 600 ("A summary
judgment movant must show both that there is no material issue of fact and that
the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Where the moving party
would bear the burden of proof at trial, the movant must establish each element of
his claim in order to show that he is entitled to judgment as a matter of law."); see
also id. ~~ 7-19 (discussing the respective burdens on summary judgment of a
moving party with and without the burden of proof at trial).
21

11
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

regarding what evidence is sufficient to support a jury verdict for a physician on
the statute of limitations defense. The determinative question here is whether the
evidence could support a jury verdict for Grigsby, making the Collins opinion's
discussion of the sufficiency of evidence issue the most instructive precedent
available. On that sufficiency of evidence issue, Collins held: "we conclude that
the jury had evidence before it to find that Collins 'discovered or should have
discovered' the injury prior to March 24, 1991." 28

2.

Collins directly refutes Arnold's claim that Grigsby failed
to establish a prim a f acie defense.

The substance of the Collins decision directly refutes Arnold's claim that
Grigsby failed to establish a primafacie defense. To defeat Arnold's motion for
summary judgment, all Grigsby had to do was demonstrate the existence of a
genuine issue of material fact, which he could achieve by presenting evidence
based upon which a jury might reasonably conclude that before December 3,
1999, Arnold knew she had sustained an injury and that such injury may be
attributable to the negligence of providers at Uintah Basin Medical Center. This is
the substantive reason why the court on summary judgment construes the facts in
favor of the nonmoving party: to avoid usurping the jury's role in weighing the
evidence.
28

Collins, 1999 UT 56, ,r 21, 984 P.2d 960.
12
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Because Arnold's affirmative motion for judgment in her favor placed
Grigsby in the role of the nonmoving party (unlike his position in Arnold IV), he
did not have to present evidence sufficient to demonstrate that regardless of how a
jury might weigh such evidence, a jury MUST conclude that before December 3,
1999, Arnold knew she had sustained an injury and that such injury may be
attributable to the negligence of providers at Uintah Basin Medical Center.
Rather, in the context of Arnold's motion for summary judgment, the only
question presented was whether Grigsby' s defense could not succeed, so as to
render weighing by the jury unnecessary.

Collins demonstrates the error of Arnold's claims on appeal because in that
case, this Court held that less evidence than Grigsby presented was sufficient to
support a jury verdict in favor of the defendant physician on the statute of
limitations. Collins held that a jury could find a patient discovered or should have
discovered legal injury based on evidence of: ( 1) awareness of continuing
problems, (2) discrepancy between the expected and actual outcomes, (3)
awareness that the surgery may have caused the problems, and (4) the passage of
time. As summarized in that opinion,
Because the Collinses' discussions with [the other health care providers]
took place between 1989 and 1990-over two years prior to the filing of this
lawsuit-and because these discussions involved, in part, the possible
connections between the original vagotomy/antrectomy surgery and the
13
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Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

post-operative motility difficulties, and because the aftermath of the surgery
was so vastly different from Collins' expectations, Collins reasonably
should have had knowledge that his injury "may be attributable to
negligence. " 29
The Court noted evidence suggesting that the patient should have been aware of a
causal connection between the defendant's care and the problems and poor
outcome the patient experienced based on discussions with health care providers. 30
However, notwithstanding the lack of evidence that any health care provider told
the patient the care was negligent or improper, 31 when construed in favor of the
jury verdict as required, this evidence "should have been enough to raise the
specter of causation in Collins' mind."32 Collins noted evidence that the patient
"had suspicions ... that something had gone wrong" with the surgery, 33 that the
outcome of the surgery (including continuing difficulties and medical problems)
were "contrary to his expectations," 34 and about the lapse of time with a

29

1d. 120.

30

Jd. 11 15, 16.

31

1d. 1 17.
1d. 11 14, 17.

32

33

Jd.118.

34Jd.
14
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continuing poor condition. 35 Moreover, unlike Arnold (who was angry with Dr.
White about the care he provided36), Mr. Collins did not take any action towards
investigating a possible claim or otherwise in the two years after the surgery
because he was not "blaming" anyone, although he was aware of the poor outcome
and the potential connection to the surgery in question. 37
Both on his own motion for summary judgment and (after Arnold IV) in
resisting Arnold's motion for summary judgment, Grigsby presented the same
types of evidence found sufficient in Collins: awareness of continuing problems, 38
the fact of complications and a poor outcome,39 and awareness of a connection
between the care in question and the poor outcome. 40 In addition, Grigsby went
beyond what was held sufficient in Collins, presenting further evidence supporting
a finding that Arnold lmew that her injury may have been caused by negligent

/d. if 19 ("It is reasonable for a jury to assume that as time progressed and
his poor condition continued, Collins' awareness grew as well.").
35

36

R. 1438-39, 1493, 4407.

37

Collins ,I 18.

38

Amold IV,I,I 4-6; R. 1348; Brief-Grigsby 12-13.

39

Arnold IV,I,I 6, 16, 31; R1347, 1421; Brief-Grigsby 12-13.

40

Arnold IV,I 6; R. 1440-41, 1500.
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care, including evidence (1) that she suspected her care was negligent, 41 (2) that
she believed she may have a malpractice claim,42 (3) that she consulted with an
attorney and initiated an investigation into a potential legal action, 43 and (4) that
she actually planned to file a lawsuit regarding the care.44 Grigsby thus presented
even more evidence to support his statute of limitations defense (and to resist
summary judgment) than Collins found sufficient to support a jury verdict on that
defense.

3.

Arnold's argument requires accepting the unreasonable
(and erroneous) conclusion that Arnold IV silently
overruled Collins v. Wilson.

As a result, accepting Arnold's argument that Arnold /Vheld that the types
of evidence outlined in that opinion are insufficient to support a jury verdict (as
opposed to inadequate to mandate summary judgment for the defendant physician)
requires also concluding that Arnold IV implicitly overruled Collins ' holding that
similar evidence (though less extensive than that presented by Grigsby) sufficed to
support a jury verdict and finding that the statute of limitations had run. The

41

ArnoldIV,r,r 6, 15, 17, 31; Brief-Grigsby 13-15.

42

Arnold IV,r 6; R. 1436-37, 1480, 1484-85; Brief-Grigsby 14-16.

43

Arnold IV,r,r 6, 20; Brief-Grigsby 15-16.

44

R. 1436-37, 1480, 1484-85.
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frailty of that assumption is highlighted by the fact that despite citing Collins in
multiple instances,45 Arnold IV nowhere states or suggests that it intended to
abandon or limit Collins ' holding regarding sufficiency of evidence to sustain a
verdict.
Further doubt on this proposition is cast by the impact of such an
interpretation on the medical malpractice statute of limitations. Accepting the
claim that certain types of evidence (knowledge of symptoms, suspicion of
negligence, and initiation of a legal investigation) are categorically insufficient to
sustain a statute of limitations defense would drastically restrict the availability of
that defense. As a practical matter, it would make a statute of limitations defense
depend on severely restricted and unlikely circumstances such as a patient in
litigation expressly admitting to knowledge of a legal injury or of a patient waiting
more than two years to sue after having been expressly told by an expert that
negligent care caused injury. However, that would be inconsistent with Arnold

!V's statement that "actual knowledge of negligence is not required" for accrual of
the statute of limitations, 46 as well as established law that an expert opinion of

45

ArnoldlV,I,I I6 n.19, 21 n.23, 28 n.53.

1d. if 18.

46
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negligence is not required for the statute to begin to run. 47 Moreover, making a
finding of knowledge dependent on an express admission is inconsistent with the
concept that knowledge or other state of mind frequently has to be established by
indirect evidence. 48
Arnold's interpretation of Arnold IV is erroneous-that opinion did not
overrule Collins with regard to sufficiency of evidence to support a jury verdict.
Measured against the Collins standard, the evidence Grigsby presented is easily
sufficient to establish a prima facie defense as to whether Arnold discovered her
legal injury before December 3, 1999. Therefore, the district court erred in

41

Deschamps v. Pulley, 784 P.2d 471, 473-74 (Utah Ct. App. 1989).

48

See State v. Nielsen, 2014 UT 10, ,I 47,326 P.3d 645 (stating, in reviewing
a sufficiency of the evidence supporting a deceased victim's state of mind in a
challenge to a verdict in criminal case, "Direct evidence is not required.
Sustainable verdicts are entered every day on the sole basis of circumstantial
evidence. And where the jury returns a verdict that is reasonably sustained by
circumstantial evidence and the inferences drawn from it, we must uphold the
jury'°s verdict." ( citations omitted)); Model Utah Jury Instructions, Second Edition,
CV1809 ("Intent ordinarily cannot be proved directly because there is no way to
read people's minds. However, you may determine intent from the surrounding
circumstances and find that [name of defendant] intended the natural and probable
consequences of acts done knowingly. You may consider any statement made or
acts done by [name of defendant] and all other facts and circumstances that may
show intent."); see also State v. James, 819 P.2d 781, 789 (Utah 1991) ("unless a
confession is made by the defendant concerning intent, or unless the court is
somehow able to open the mind of the defendant to examine his motivations,
intent is of necessity proven by circumstantial evidence"); State v. Casey, 2003 UT
55, ,r 48, 82 P .3d 1106 (intent usually must be inferred from circumstances).
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granting partial summary judgment and ruling that Arnold did not know she had a
legal injury before that date.
C.

The district court relied on Arnold's erroneous interpretation of
Arnold IV and imposed an improper burden on Grigsby in
granting partial summary judgment to Arnold.

Under the applicable standard of review, no deference is due by this Court
to the district court's partial grant of Arnold's motion for summary judgment49 and
this Court will "view the facts and all reasonable inferences drawn therefrom in
the light most favorable to the nonmoving party." 50 However, given Arnold's
insistence that the district court correctly applied the summary judgment standard
and did not impose an improper burden on Grig~by, in furtherance of this Court's
review, it is useful to identify specifically how the district court was led astray by
Arnold.

It is readily apparent from the district court's rulings that in granting
summary judgment to Arnold on the "discovered" aspect of the statute of
limitations defense, it accepted Arnold's erroneous characterization of Arnold IV
as establishing that the types of evidence discussed in that opinion are
categorically insufficient to support a verdict for Grigsby and thus could not be
49

See, e.g., Pearce v. Utah Athletic Found., 2008 UT 13, 1 13, 179 P.3d 760.

50

Smith v. Four Corners Mental Health Ctr. Inc., 2003 UT 23, 12, 70 P.3d
904 (internal quotation marks omitted).
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relied on by a jury weighing the evidence to support a verdict in his favor.
Explaining its understanding of Arnold's position, the district court stated:
The Plaintiffs argue that in Arnold, the Court found that the facts Dr.
Grigsby presented concerning when Ms. Arnold, through reasonable
diligence, discovered or should have discovered her legal injury, were
deficient as a matter of law to trigger the running of the statute of
limitations. Consequently, the Plaintiffs argue that a jury could not find that
the statute of limitations had run before filing their Complaint unless the
jury based the decision purely on speculation. 51
Tl:l;e district court's other statements demonstrate that it accepted this erroneous
reading of Arnold IV, agreeing that despite the changed posture of construing the
evidence in Grigsby' s favor, the evidence was categorically insufficient to create a
genuine issue of material fact (i.e., insufficient to support a jury verdict for
Grigsby):
While the Utah Supreme Court repeatedly stressed that the issue should be
decided by a jury, the facts the Defendant presented were found insufficient
to trigger the statute of limitations as a matter oflaw. 52
The Utah Supreme Court has already determined that hiring an attorney and
initiating an investigation into whether Mrs. Arnold's injuries were caused
by negligence is insufficient to trigger the running of the statute of
limitations. The statement on the sticky note, therefore, is insufficient as a
matter oflaw to establish that Ms. Arnold had discovered her legal injury
- by August 26, 1999.53

51

R. 1546 (emphasis added).

52

R. 1547 (emphasis added).

53

R. 1549 (emphasis added).
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At most, the nurse's statement that Arnold would die if she didn't leave the
UBMC gave Arnold reason to suspect the existence of a legal injury. The
Utah Supreme Court has held that mere suspicion of a legal injury is
insufficient to trigger the running of the statute of limitations. 54
Summarizing, the district court stated:
The undisputed material facts establish that Ms. Arnold had not discovered
her legal injury before December 3, 1999. Clearly, Arnold suspected an
injury, consulted an attorney, and initiated an investigation to discover the
cause of the injury. None of these acts trigger the statute oflimitations. 55
Therefore, the court concluded, "Plaintiff, as a matter of law, did not discover her
legal injury prior to December 3, 1999."56 The district court thus made an
affirmative finding that Arn.old subjectively did not discover her legal injury,
going even further into error than the erroneous conclusion that Arnold JV held
that such evidence was insufficient to establish a genuine issue of material fact.
Arnold asserts "There is no suggestion in the district court's ruling that it
improperly required Dr. Grigsby to prove the presence of actual knowledge," but
that instead the court "simply concluded that there was no evidence that she had
actual knowledge." 57 However, in addition to the district court's conclusion that

56

R. 1551.

57

Reply-Amold 13.
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the "facts establish that Ms. Arnold had not discoverecf' 58 her legal injury, that
court's later clarification of its own ruling demonstrates that is exactly what the
court did. Referencing its prior ruling of September 24, 2014, the district court
stated, "The Court found that the facts offered by the Defendant did not show that
the Plaintiff actually knew of her injury prior to December 3, 1999, as a matter of
law." 59 This plainly states that the court expected Grigsby to produce evidence
establishing as a matter of law that Arnold actually lmew of her legal injury in
order to avoid summary judgment. If the district court had applied the proper
standard (even according to Arnold's erroneous reading of Arnold IV), it would
have ruled that there was no genuine issue of material fact because, despite
construing all the evidence in favor of Grigsby, no jury could conclude that
Arnold in fact !mew of her injury and that such injury may have been due to
negligence.
CONCLUSION
Applying the correct understanding of Arnold IV and the proper burdens on
summary judgment, within the context of what Collins demonstrates is sufficient
evidence to support a jury verdict for Dr. Grigsby on the statute of limitations, it is

58

R. 1549 (emphasis added).

9R. 2345-46 (emphasis added).

5
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readily apparent that the district court erred in granting partial summary judgment
to Arnold on whether she discovered her claim before December 1999 and in
depriving Grigsby of his day in court on that issue. Those same considerations
also demonstrate that, as set forth in Grigsby's prior brief, the district court
correctly denied Arnold's motion for summary judgment on whether she should
have discovered her legal injury before December 1999 and correctly denied
Arnold's motion for directed verdict at trial.
Grigsby thus requests that in the event the Court were to grant Arnold's
request for a new trial, the Court reverse the partial grant of summary judgment to
Arnold and direct jury trial on that issue as well. In the event that the Court
upholds the jury verdict in favor of Grigsby, as urged in Grigsby' s prior brief, the
error in granting partial summary judgment is moot.
DATED this 10th day of May, 2017.
BURBIDGE & WI-IlTE, LLC

Larry~te~

Paul D. Van Komen

c£~
Patrick L. Tanner

Attorneys for David Grigsby, M.D.
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